CEO incentives in European energy utilities: Evidence from regulated versus unregulated firms by Cambini, Carlo et al.
CEO incentives in European energy utilities: evidence
from regulated versus unregulated firms
Carlo Cambini1,2 • Sara De Masi3,4 •
Laura Rondi1,5
Received: 24 July 2015 / Revised: 5 January 2016 /Accepted: 11 January 2016 /
Published online: 25 January 2016
 Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale 2016
Abstract This paper studies the effect of incentive mechanisms provided by
economic regulation and CEO compensation in European energy firms. We
investigate the differences in CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity across regulated
and unregulated firms on CEO monetary incentives. Using various measures of firm
performance, we find that CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is lower in regu-
lated companies. These results hold when we control for national corporate gov-
ernance variables (investor protection, legal origin, disclosure requirements and
contract enforcement). Our findings suggest that incentive compensation is a weaker
incentive mechanism for firms operating in regulated and less-competitive markets.
Keywords Corporate governance  CEO compensation  Pay-for-performance
sensitivity  Regulation  European energy utilities
JEL Classification G3  G38  J33  L51
& Sara De Masi
sara.demasi@unifi.it
Carlo Cambini
carlo.cambini@polito.it
Laura Rondi
laura.rondi@polito.it
1 Department of Management (DIGEP), Politecnico di Torino, Torino, Italy
2 IEFE-Bocconi University, Milan, Italy
3 Department of Economics and Management, University of Florence, Florence, Italy
4 Kent State University, Florence, Italy
5 CERIS-CNR, Milan, Italy
123
Econ Polit Ind (2016) 43:127–155
DOI 10.1007/s40812-016-0028-7
1 Introduction
Beginning with the seminal work by Jensen and Murphy (1990), CEO compensation
and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity have been one of the most widely studied
topics in corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Murphy 1999; Bebchuk
and Fried 2004; Frydman and Saks 2010; Fernandes et al. 2013; Cheng et al. 2015).
In any firm that separates ownership and control, CEO compensation has been
suggested as a possible mechanism to align the CEO’s interests with those of the
shareholders. When shareholders cannot perfectly monitor a CEO’s decisions (or
when they are unlikely to know which actions are value maximizing), the CEO is
likely to make decisions intended to maximize his own interests rather than those of
the shareholders. Pay-for-performance compensation contracts, which link CEO pay
to shareholder wealth via performance indicators, can be a powerful way to
motivate and induce CEOs to make decisions that maximize shareholders’ wealth.
Such pay-for-performance contracts originate internally, with the firm. It is the
board of directors which defines the appropriate incentives for management,
particularly for the CEO (Tricker 2012). However, incentives for CEOs may also
originate externally, from the business environment. Market competition is a
powerful mechanism that may influence how CEOs behave. Specifically, in
competitive markets CEOs must make decisions that increase firm performance,
firm productivity and shareholder wealth to ensure the firm’s survival. Competitive
markets are expected to provide incentives that mitigate the classical managerial
agency problems between managers and shareholders (Hart 1983; Holmstro¨m and
Tirole 1989; Giroud and Mueller 2010). In non-competitive markets, where the
competitive pressure is weaker, managerial slack, conflict of interests and agency
problems are more intense.
The impact of regulation on managers’ incentives is unclear. Whereas regulation
reduces CEOs’ discretion, it is also expected to encourage both effort and efficiency.
This paper investigates whether pay-performance sensitivity differs between
regulated and deregulated segments. In particular, we study the energy industry
to analyze CEO incentives and how internal incentives (i.e., pay-for-performance
contracts) may interact with external incentives (i.e., the external environment). In
this respect, the EU energy industry is a relevant case study because its regulatory
reforms were introduced only two decades ago in most of the Member States
(except for the UK, where the process began much earlier). We thus provide a case
study of the functioning of one important—and costly to the shareholders—
corporate governance mechanism when market competition is not fully effective.
Our paper also aims to shed more light on the incentive structure of firms that cover
a large share, in terms of market capitalization, in the EU equity market.
The energy sector provides an interesting context to study because in its
transmission and distribution segments, it is a non-competitive market in which
economic regulation continues to play a strong influencing role. On the one hand,
economic regulation intervenes by specifying what firms can and cannot do. By
limiting CEOs’ discretion to make managerial decisions, regulation may weaken the
power of CEOs’ internal incentives. On the other hand, economic regulation is
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intended to provide additional incentives to invest, innovate and operate that mimic
the competitive mechanism. Moreover, energy firms that were previously vertically
integrated were either unbundled and incorporated in ‘‘new’’ legal entities subject to
different regulatory regimes or unregulated altogether. By providing incentives to
firms, regulation may thus power the ‘‘external incentive’’ that motivates CEOs.
Overall, the implications of economic regulation for CEO incentives and in turn, for
energy utilities’ performance, are uncertain. This paper aims to shed light on the
interaction between CEOs’ internal and external disciplinary mechanisms to
understand whether those mechanisms complement or substitute each other in
enhancing firm efficiency.
More specifically, we analyze the relationship between CEO pay and firm
performance within a sample of European publicly listed energy utilities from 2000
to 2011, focusing on the differential responses that arise from being subject to
regulation (or not). The energy industry provides a perfect setting to study such
relationships. In the early 1990s, most European countries introduced a set of
liberalization and privatization reforms that profoundly changed the energy sector.
Many European countries set up their own national regulatory authorities (NRAs)
that regulated distribution and transmission operations in the energy industry,
whereas the generation segment was fully liberalized. However, after more than two
decades of market reforms, the degree of liberalization remains heterogeneous
across countries and the privatization process is largely incomplete.1 These different
regulatory settings and market conditions provide us with the within-sector
heterogeneity that allows us to build a suitable framework to closely study the
interaction between the state of regulation and the incentives provided by either
firms or the market.
We focus on differences in pay-performance sensitivities across firms regulated
by an NRA (such as transmission and distribution operators) and unregulated
companies (generation) within the same industry, thus departing from existing
studies that typically compare regulated utilities with unregulated manufacturing-
sector companies (Joskow et al. 1993; Yermack 1995; Palia 2000; Adams and
Mehran 2003). This paper also differs from Cambini et al. (2015), who investigate
the effect of incentive vs. cost-based regulation. Whereas our previous study
analyzed the impact of structural and regulatory changes in the EU’s energy
industries, this paper focuses on the differences between regulated (i.e., transmis-
sion and distribution) and unregulated (i.e., generation) firms. The key aspect of this
analysis is the differential effect on managerial compensation that may be generated
by the presence of competitive pressure typical of firms operating in deregulated
segments of an industry with respect to firms operating in highly regulated segments
of that same industry.
We find that CEO compensation in regulated segments is lower and less
responsive to variations in firm performance than it is in the unregulated generation
segment. This difference can be explained, at least in part, by the different
competitive pressures within the different segments of the industry after
1 For a description of the evolution of the institutional setting within EU utilities, see Barontini and Bozzi
(2011).
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liberalization. Managers of transmission or distribution utilities operate in a less
competitive environment, where profitability targets are more or less set—and
somewhat guaranteed—by regulators. For this reason, shareholders may be more
reluctant to bear the agency costs that are associated with high monetary incentives
tied to firm performance. Alternatively, as suggested by Joskow et al. (1996), the
regulatory environment may impose political constraints (in other words, a cap) on
executive compensation. Specifically, in many regulated utilities, particularly if
those controlled by a national or a local government, directors either are politicians
or are appointed by politicians who are subject to public pressure. Therefore, to
prevent the public from judging executive compensation to be excessive, CEO
remuneration is less tied to firm profitability.
Our results survive several robustness checks. In particular, we account for the
ownership share held by the state (because many energy firms are still partially
owned by the local or national government), for the country-/industry-specific
degree of competition and openness in the energy sector, and for within-sample
differences across the electricity and gas sectors. Interestingly, we find that
executive compensation increases as the industry becomes more competitive and
liberalized, and it decreases when a firm is controlled by the state. Next, we consider
the multinational structure of many energy companies. Our findings show that for
CEOs in multinational firms, pay-for-performance sensitivity does not differ
between regulated and unregulated firms, whereas that difference survives and is
significant within local energy firms that operate in a single country.
Finally, we also control for the impact of national governance attributes by
including country-specific variables for the origin of the legal system, the degree of
minority shareholder protection, the efficiency of debt contracts’ enforcement and
the strength of disclosure requirements. Again, the main result holds, i.e., pay is less
sensitive to performance in regulated energy firms.
Our findings for a representative sample of large and highly valued European
companies offer insights to financial investors to pay attention not only to
remuneration schemes but also to regulatory settings: unregulated companies are
more likely to adopt performance-based regimes to incentivize managers than are
regulated companies. At the same time, even though multinational firms are subject
to ex ante control, they are more similar to unregulated companies than to ‘‘local’’
companies. This implies that exposure to internationalization makes performance-
based compensation more likely to be adopted even in a less competitive, regulated
environment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the literature review.
Section 3 discusses recent reforms and regulatory policies in the European energy
industry. Section 4 describes the data and the variables used in the estimation.
Section 5 presents the empirical modeling and the testable hypotheses. Section 6
discusses the results of the econometric analysis and Sect. 7 concludes.
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2 Literature review
In firms that separate ownership and control, agency costs between shareholders and
managers are likely to arise. Specifically, shareholders are interested in having
managers make decisions that maximize firm value, whereas managers are typically
more concerned with their own wealth and well-being (Jensen and Meckling 1976;
Demsetz 1983; Fama and Jensen 1983; Hart et al. 1997). Moreover, information
asymmetries make it difficult for shareholders to monitor managers’ actions and to
understand which investment opportunities could maximize their wealth. To
alleviate these typical principal-agent problems and to align shareholders and
managers’ interests, scholars and practitioners have considered several corporate
governance mechanisms (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
Among others, compensation policies that tie CEO welfare to shareholder wealth
can be a powerful tool to decrease agency costs and discourage opportunistic
behaviors by managers.2
The structure of CEO compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity play a
special role within a company. Early studies such as Murphy (1985), Gibbons and
Murphy (1990), and Jensen and Murphy (1990), document the relationship between
CEO pay and corporate performance. They argue that when CEO compensation
depends on firm results, CEOs will benefit from firm value-maximizing decisions.
Therefore, in the absence of strong board mechanisms that can monitor the internal
decision-making process, firms may benefit from using either stock-based or
accounting indicators or both as performance measures to link executive compen-
sation to performance (Bushman et al. 1996; Fernandes et al. 2013).
Most of this vast empirical literature focuses on US companies (among others,
Hall and Liebman 1998; Guay 1999; Frydman 2009; Frydman and Saks 2010).
These studies find the predicted positive relationship between executive compen-
sation and firm performance in US companies and they highlight the relevance of
compensation contracts in providing incentives for CEOs.
In Europe, the evidence on executive compensation is more recent. One
interesting early study on international differences in executive compensation is that
of Abowd and Bognanno (1995). They show that in the US, managerial pay is
higher and more sensitive to both firm size and long-term compensation plans such
as stock options than in European countries. Conyon et al. (2013) and Conyon and
Murphy (2000) show that CEO pay is more tightly linked to performance in the US
than throughout most of Europe and that American executives hold more wealth in
company stock and options than do their European counterparts. One comparative
study on executive compensation in countries with mandated pay disclosures is that
of Fernandes et al. (2013), who show that US CEOs receive a higher fraction of their
compensation in the form of stock and options and they earn an average of 26 %
more than their foreign counterparts. Looking at only European companies, Muslu
(2010) studies the effect of the board composition on CEO compensation. He
provides evidence that for the largest 158 companies in Germany, France and the
UK, the sensitivity of executive pay-for-performance increases with the proportion
2 For comprehensive surveys, see Murphy (1999), Goergen and Renneboog (2011) and Murphy (2012).
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of executives on the board and with a dual CEO/chairman. Croci et al. (2012) show
that in continental Europe, differences in the level of CEO compensation depend on
a corporation’s ownership structure.
Another stream of the research focuses on CEO compensation and market
competition as an important condition for the severity of the agency problem (Hart
1983; Hermalin 1992; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Giroud and Mueller 2010;
Beiner et al. 2011). These papers show that product market competition encourages
managerial efforts while disciplining managerial slack. By pushing managers to be
efficient, such competition may even render additional incentives redundant
(Schmidt 1997). In line with this reasoning, Nickell (1996) and Giroud and Mueller
(2010) find that industry competition can be an effective substitute for other
governance mechanisms.
The literature on executive compensation in non-competitive and more generally,
regulated sectors is less abundant and primarily relates to the financial industry. By
constraining firms’ activities, regulation alters the internal incentives that result
from standard market-based mechanism. Hubbard and Palia (1995), Booth et al.
(2002), Becher and Frye (2011) and Adams and Ferreira (2012) argue that in the
bank industry, the threat of regulatory scrutiny and corrective actions can pressure
regulated firms to adopt effective corporate governance monitoring systems.
Within regulated firms, there is even less empirical evidence on public utilities.
Because of the particular features of this industry, managers may behave differently
and therefore need different forms of incentives. Carroll and Ciscel (1982) and
Murphy (1999) analyze compensation in several industries in the US, documenting
that the variable portion of a CEO’s annual pay is less important in the context of
utility firms. Comparing regulated and unregulated companies, Joskow et al. (1993)
find that the CEOs of economically regulated US firms earn significantly less than
the CEOs of unregulated firms. They argue that this difference reflects, at least in
part, the political constraints on CEO compensation imposed, directly and
indirectly, by the regulated environment in which the firms operate. According to
their view, regulators are reluctant to allow compensation levels that the public
might judge to be excessive and as a result, they are reluctant to tie CEO
compensation to firm profitability. Yermack (1995) compares US regulated and
unregulated firms, showing that US executives in banking, insurance and utilities
receive lower incentives from compensation or equity ownership than in unregu-
lated industries. This is probably because the reduced managerial discretion in these
industries diminishes the consequences of good or bad decisions. Thus, regulation
generates more pressure to limit standard pay-for-performance schemes. Palia
(2000) conducts a study on the differences in compensation schemes during the
deregulation process in the US utility sector, finding that CEOs in utilities have less
pay-performance sensitivity than CEOs operating in manufacturing firms and that
after deregulation, pay-performance sensitivity is higher in the utilities.
Whereas the majority of existing studies address regulated companies in the US,
the empirical evidence on CEO pay-performance for European energy utilities is
very scant. Most of this research focuses more on board composition and
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governance than on CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity (Bender 2003). A recent
study by Cambini et al. (2015) investigates CEO pay-for-performance differences
across alternative regulatory regimes in the European energy utilities. They find that
managerial compensation is sensitive to performance only if is subject to incentive
regulation, such as price-cap regulation or benchmarking. They also document that
incentive regulation makes managerial entrenchment less likely.
3 Regulatory policy and privatization reforms in the European Energy
Industry: an institutional background
In the European utility industry, the degree of liberalization is heterogeneous across
countries and the privatization process remains incomplete (Bortolotti et al. 2011).
From a model largely characterized by vertical integration, state monopolies and
public ownership, the sector has been gradually liberalized and vertically
unbundled. The energy industry has thus evolved into an industrial organization
with more degrees of market opening (in the generation and retailing segments),
easier access to essential facilities and private investors’ involvement in the
ownership of assets as many energy firms were taken public. Substantial progress
has been made towards the creation of a single market for energy utilities in Europe,
even if individual countries’ market structures are not yet converging towards a
single, uniform pattern.
The UK was the laboratory for the first large-scale structural reform experiment
in the energy utility sector. The approach taken by the European Commission when
liberalizing the Member States’ energy sectors considered previous experiences,
particularly in the UK, which ultimately led to a strong vertical and horizontal
deintegration of the industry combined with solid regulation.
Beginning in 1988, the regulatory problem was addressed through a series of
measures and directives that established a common de minimis legal framework
among the Member States, which were called to transpose those measures and
directives into their national laws. In the attempt to construct an internal energy
market for the electricity and gas sectors, the two milestone EU Directives are 96/92
and 98/30 for the electricity and gas markets, respectively (Cambini and Rondi
2010). Their purpose was both to gradually introduce competition in generation/
production and to unbundle the various segments in the energy value chain. To
achieve this goal, Network System Operators were established as entities carrying
out specific system functions, by creating a level playing field for access to
transmission and distribution networks, and by forcing the unbundling of vertically
integrated operators (the incumbents), at leasSt at the accounting level.
The two Directives also established national regulatory authorities (NRA).3
Initially, the new regulatory bodies were simply granted powers to settle disputes
among operators and were only required to be independent from the parties
involved. In time, the European Commission (EC) legislation broadened the NRAs’
powers to ensure/enforce non-discrimination, effective competition, the unbundling
3 Art. 20 Directive 96/92/EC and art. 21 of Directive 98/30/EC.
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of operations and ultimately, the implementation of incentive regulation regimes to
boost firm efficiency.4
The third energy package, Directive 2009/72/EC, further increased the unbundling
requirements. Now, EU Member States can choose one of three unbundling models:
ownership unbundling, an independent system operator or an independent transmis-
sion operator. Although the effects of the various unbundling methods are still under
discussion, most countries have already switched to ownership unbundling.
With respect to firm ownership, from the beginning, EC Directives did not
provide any recommendation about the ownership structure of public utilities in
liberalized markets, leaving the privatization decision completely in the hands of
national governments. As of 2013, privatization of EU energy firms is far from
complete, and central and local governments still hold majority or minority
ownership stakes in many regulated utilities, particularly in Austria, France,
Finland, Germany and Italy (see Cambini et al. 2012).
Because of these liberalization and privatization reforms, energy utilities under-
went a deep change: manywent public, opening their capital both to new investors and
to various categories of shareholders that naturally aim to maximize firm value.
However, although these firms are now public and have modified their behaviors and
goals accordingly, embracing shareholders’ viewmore than before, the maximization
of shareholder value is not their only consideration. Energy utilities remain firms that
provide services of general interest and, as mentioned above, they continue to operate
in a regulated environment that imposes constraints on their behavior and their
governance. In this new framework, the net effect of CEOs’ regulatory incentives and
governance mechanisms typical of public equity markets is unclear and is worth
analyzing in the context of European energy utilities.
4 The sample
Because of liberalization and privatization reforms in the early 1990s, most
European countries regulate distribution and transmission activities in the energy
industry. Electric and gas utilities, most of which were once fully integrated state
monopolies, underwent a profound change: many companies unbundled their
generation, transmission and distribution activities and went public, opening their
capital to new investors and different categories of shareholders that naturally aim
to maximize firm value. To test the interaction between regulation and governance
mechanisms, we use a sample of 59 listed public utilities in the energy industry
(electricity and gas) from 12 European countries (Spain, France, UK, Germany,
Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Finland and Belgium) over
the period 2000–2011. To select these companies, we started from the sample of
firms in the ‘‘Energy’’ sector of the Worldscope database (the main source of our
accounting data). Next, we checked whether these companies are classified as
energy firms in the ‘‘Utilities’’ sector of the stock exchange in which they are traded.
We then excluded all companies belonging to the ‘‘Industrial’’ sector of their
4 Art. 23 Directive 2003/54 and Art. 25 Directive 2003/55.
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exchange because their primary activity is primarily related to the construction of
energy plants or equipment, such as solar panels or collectors, wind towers and so
forth, not to the provision of energy services. Finally, we select energy firms that
both locate their primary operations in a European country and (obviously) report
CEO compensation data. Although our sample may seem small, it is highly
representative in that it covers an average of approximately 90 % of total market
capitalization of the largest publicly listed energy operators in Europe that meet the
above requirements. Among the 59 energy utilities in our sample, 43 transmission
and distribution operators are subject to regulation, whereas 16 companies operate
in the deregulated energy generation segment.
Data are collected from different sources. Data about CEO compensation and
tenure are hand collected; each company’s annual corporate governance reports are
downloaded. This collection process makes the dataset unique. Our data on CEO
compensation are carefully divided into salaries and annual bonuses. A compre-
hensive measure of CEO pay should consider the values of the CEO’s stock and
option holdings, but these data were not available for all firms on a consistent basis.
Specifically, when we tried to collect the data we found that for most of the
European energy utilities, information about the use of stock options and a detailed
description of individual CEOs’ stock option plans (i.e., the number of options, the
exercise price, the exercise date etc.) are not fully disclosed. Because we could only
rely on a partial, approximate picture of the real effect of stock options, we decided
that adding this partial information would only lead to misleading results. Following
Jensen and Murphy (1990), we thus calculate CEO compensation as the sum
between salary and bonus awarded by the CEO in a year.
Financial and accounting data come from Datastream-Worldscope and Compustat
Global database. Datastream-Worldscope is a global financial database that covers
equities, stock market measures and company fundamentals. Compustat Global
consists of the annual and quarterly report data for listed companies. It provides
complete information about income statements and balance sheets of non-US
companies. From these sources, we obtained the variables to calculate both book- and
market-based measures of performance. We thus use the ratio of EBIT to total assets,
called ROA, as a measure of accounting profitability. Although ROA is not a perfect
measure, it is one of the most effective measures to assess company performance. It
captures the fundamentals of business performance, looking at both income statement
performance and the assets required to run a business. Because this ratio is based on the
book value of assets and not on the market value, as market-based indicators we use
Stockret (stock return, i.e., the one-year stock return for the firm over its fiscal year)
and MarketCap (market capitalization, i.e., the product between the share price at the
end of the year and the number of outstanding shares in the market).
One key variable in this study is regulation. Regulatory status varies across
countries, across the energy industry’s segments and between the electric power and
gas sectors. Following the reform process in the European energy sector, we define a
firm as regulated or de(un)regulated based on its primary activity (transmission and
distribution versus generation and retailing in electricity and gas service,
respectively). Typically, firms classified as generators produce energy from primary
or renewable resources. Generation companies are typically very large, publicly
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traded, and not subject to regulation, whereas retailers are usually small and unlisted
and thus, do not qualify for inclusion in our dataset. In our sample, companies that
generate electricity and/or gas are classified as unregulated, whereas companies
operating in the transmission and distribution segments are classified as regulated.
Finally, when we inspected each company’s business activity, we allocate each
company to the unregulated or regulated subsample according to its main revenue
source. For example, we noticed that a few distributors are also involved in
generation; accordingly, in this case we classified firms according to their largest
activity based on the information available in the annual reports. In Appendix 1, we
provide a list of the energy firms in our sample by country and regulatory status.
To test the robustness of our results, we consider three main potential sources of
influence: firm ownership, the actual extent of market liberalization and reforms and
stock market development. We thus collected information about the ownership
status of each firm in the sample. In particular, we define firms as ‘‘privately
controlled’’ if the state holds (either directly or indirectly) less than 30 % of the
firm’s control rights (i.e., if private investors hold at least 70 % of the control
rights). To measure the state’s ultimate control rights (UCR), we use the weakest-
link approach (see, e.g., La Porta et al. 1999). According to this approach, the UCRs
of a given investor (the state in our case) are equal to the minimum ownership stake
along a chain (i.e., the weakest link). In the case of multiple chains, the UCR are
summed across all chains.5
The various paces and intensity of liberalization that characterizes the energy
industries in various countries may also affect incentive compensation schemes. To
control for this additional effect, we use the OECD index of the Product Market
Regulation database by Conway and Nicoletti (2006). This index is an average of
several indicators varying from 0 to 6 (lower numbers indicate a greater degree of
market openness) and allows for entry barriers, the vertical structure of the market,
the market share of the dominant player(s),6 and the presence of the state as a
shareholder. We eliminate the state ownership component from the index because
we have already constructed a ‘‘firm-by-firm’’ ownership dummy (instead of using a
sectoral-level variable) and recalculate the average over the remaining OECD
subindicators (market entry, vertical integration and market structure). As in the
original OECD index, high index values are associated with low degrees of market
competition and liberalization.
Finally, to control for the impact of national governance attributes, we use a set
of country-level variables (see, e.g., Aslan and Kumar 2014). To capture the cross-
country differences in the area of investor and property-rights protection, we use a
dummy variable, Common Law, which is equal to 1 if the country’s legal origin is
the common law (versus the civil law) (La Porta et al. 1999). To account for
efficiency in the enforcement of contracts and the quality of disclosure
5 Here we implement the same methodology as in Barontini and Bozzi (2011). We merged ownership
information from that database (ranging from 1994 to 2005) and then completed the data up to 2010 with
hand-collected information from companies’ Websites.
6 Low values of the entry-barrier indicators are associated with competition in all segments of the
relevant sector and with vertical separation between downstream and upstream firms. High values are
associated with the existence of a vertically integrated legal monopoly.
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requirements, we use, Enforcement Index (Djankov et al. 2008) and Disclosure
Index (La Porta et al. 1999). We then include two time-varying variables to control
for economic development (GDP) and stock-market development measured as the
ratio between market capitalization and GDP (MarketCap_GDP).
Table 1 provides the variable definitions and Table 2 reports the summary
statistics for the full sample. In Table 3, we report the descriptive statistics for the
regulated and unregulated subsamples and the results of simple tests of mean
differences. In Appendix 2, we report the data by country.
At the country level, CEO compensation appears to be highest in Germany and
Spain; however, we also note that firms in these countries are very large, confirming
the typically positive correlation between pay and firm size (Baker and Hall 2004).
Managers seem to be well paid in Finland, Austria and (to a lesser extent) Italy,
where firms are not only quite large but also profitable in terms of ROA.
Interestingly, we observe that although firm accounting profitability seems to be
higher in the UK than in any other country, UK energy managers appear to be paid
less than average, although they achieve the highest profitability levels. In Table 3,
we find several interesting differences as we note that compared to unregulated
energy utilities, regulated firms are (on average) larger and more state controlled,
but they pay their managers more (the evidence on profitability is mixed and
statistically insignificant). Moreover, and unsurprisingly, the average OECD
indexes show that regulated firms operate in less open and liberalized segments.
Finally, the share of regulated firms is higher in countries where shareholder
protection is weaker and financial markets are less developed.
Clearly, the descriptive statistics not only highlight several intriguing differences
but also reveal that too many factors should be considered. Therefore, in the
following section, we turn to the results from the regression analysis.
5 Empirical approach
This paper’s main purpose is to determine how the incentives provided by CEO
compensation interrelate with the incentives provided by economic regulation. We
focus on the energy industry. By looking at a single industry’s CEOs, who therefore
have tasks, required expertise and attributes that are relatively similar (compared to
other manufacturing sectors), we can more effectively isolate the effect of the
various regulatory frameworks on the relationship between pay and performance.
Because, electric and gas utilities might rely on different types of corporate
governance mechanisms to some extent, we also estimate their pay-for-performance
sensitivity separately.
5.1 Measuring pay-performance sensitivity
Pay-performance sensitivity is the relationship that reveals the presence of incentive
compensation contractual schemes. It is usually defined as a change in CEO pay
associated with a change in firm performance (Frydman and Saks 2010; Goergen
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Table 1 Variables description
Variable name Label Description Source
CEO comp CEO compensation It is computed as the sum between salary and
bonus awarded by CEOs at the end of the
year. (Thousands of Euros)
Hand collected
Stock Return Stock Return It is calculated using prices from end-of-
period to end-of-period (fiscal year).
r(t) = {[p(t)f(t)/p (t0)] - 1}where p(t) is the
sale price or closing bid at time t, f(t) is the
factor to adjust price by splits and dividends
in period t; p(t’) is the sale price or closing
bid at the previous period
Worldscope
ROA Return on Assets It is calculated as: (Net Income before
Preferred Dividends ? ((Interest Expense
on Debt-Interest Capitalized) 9 (1 - Tax
Rate)))/Average of Last Year’s and Current
Year’s Total Assets 9 100
Worldscope
Market Cap Market
capitalization
It is Market Price-Fiscal Period
End 9 Common Shares Outstanding
Worldscope
Log (Total
Asset)
Logarithm of Total
Assets
It is the logarithmic transformation (base 10)
of Total Assets
Worldscope
Tenure CEO tenure It indicates the number of years served as
CEO
Datastream
REG Regulation It is a dummy that assumes 1 if the firm is
under regulation.
Company
websites
State
Ownership
Government control
rights
It is a dummy that assumes 1 if the
government holds at least 30 % of the
ultimate control rights
Company
websites
OECD Index of
Liberalization
Index of market
competition
It ranges from 0 to 6. A high value is
associated with a low degree of market
competition and liberalization
OECD
Market Cap/
GDP
Total stock market
capitalization
over GDP
It is the ratio of the total market capitalization
and GDP in a country in a given year
OECD
Shareholder
Protection
Index of minority
shareholder
protection
It ranges from 0 to 27. A high value is
associated with a stronger level of
shareholder protection
Martynova and
Renneboog
(2011)
Legal Origin Legal Origin It is a dummy that assumes 1 if the legal
origin is common law and 0 otherwise
Aslan and
Kumar
(2014)
Anti Director Index of
shareholder
protection
It measures the extent of minority shareholder
protection and ranges from 0 to 7 as
shareholders’ rights protection increases
Aslan and
Kumar
(2014)
Enforcement
Index
Index of debt
enforcement
It measures the efficiency of debt enforcement
and is equal to the estimated average
duration (years) from the declaration of
default to the time of debtor payment
Aslan and
Kumar
(2014)
Disclosure
Index
Index of
information
disclosure
requirements
It measures the strength of national disclosure
regulations
Aslan and
Kumar
(2014)
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and Renneboog 2011). The incentive effects of CEO compensation are typically
calculated using various metrics and performance variables. In their seminal paper,
Jensen and Murphy (1990) define pay-for-performance sensitivity as the dollar
change in a CEO’s wealth associated with a dollar change in the shareholders’
Table 2 Descriptive statistics (full sample)
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
CEO compensation 418 1262.67 1491.03 114.04 11,640.74
Stock Return 492 0.08 0.38 -1 1.89
ROA (%) 535 6.90 7.03 -42.09 79.09
Market capitalization 485 1.36 9 107 2.27 9 107 4503.35 2.10 9 108
Log (Total Asset) 580 15.47 2.23 4.66 19.23
CEO Tenure 520 3.71 2.39 1 12
State Ownership 674 0.55 0.50 0 1
OECD Index of Liberalization 674 1.46 1.63 0 6
Market Cap/GDP 656 89.65 60.08 12.79 309.45
Corporate Governance country level controls
Shareholder Protection 651 19.61 4.62 11 26
Common Law 548 0.32 0.47 0 1
Anti Director 548 4.05 0.72 2.5 5
Enforcement Index 548 5.83 0.86 4.46 7.23
Disclosure Index 548 0.66 0.14 0.42 0.83
Notes: CEO compensations, Market capitalization and Total Assets are in Thousands of 2005 constant
Euros
Table 3 Descriptive statistics regulated vs. unregulated firms
Variable Regulated segments (TSO,
DSO)
Deregulated segment
(Generation)
Diff.
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD t
CEO compensation 321 1333.37 1638.36 97 1028.67 798.44 *
Stock Return 396 0.09 0.35 96 0.05 0.48 –
ROA (%) 431 6.83 4.61 104 7.21 12.95 –
Market capitalization 386 1.35*107 2.28*107 99 1.42*107 2.24*107 –
Log (Total Asset) 450 15.85 1.69 128 14.16 3.19 ***
CEO Tenure 401 3.73 2.40 118 3.66 2.36 –
State Ownership 490 0.66 0.47 161 0.23 0.42 ***
OECD Index of Liberalization 490 1.58 1.74 161 0.98 1.11 ***
Shareholder Protection 488 19.41 4.43 161 20.23 5.16 *
Market Cap/GDP 490 85.12 65.44 161 104.32 37.14 ***
Notes: CEO compensation, Market capitalization and Total Assets are in Thousands of 2005 constant
Euros
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wealth. This specification measures the magnitude of the CEO’s sensitivity to
changes in the firm performance and denotes the CEO’s ‘‘share’’ of value creation.
A second metric widely used in the literature is the elasticity of pay to firm
performance. In this case, both CEO compensation and firm performance are in
logarithm form. The regression coefficient is interpreted as the percentage change in
the CEO’s wealth associated with the percentage change in the wealth of
shareholders. The third metric is the semi-elasticity of pay for performance, in
which the dependent variable, CEO compensation, is in the logarithmic form and
the independent variable, firm performance, is in the linear form. The regression
coefficient is the semi-elasticity of CEO compensation with respect to shareholder
value (Joskow et al. 1993): it indicates the percentage change in CEO compensation
caused by a unit change in the variable that measures firm performance. In each of
these three specifications, the higher coefficient is interpreted as a closer alignment
of interests between the CEO and his shareholders and as consequence, a stronger
incentive for the CEO.
In our models, we calculate the pay-performance semi-elasticity and elasticity to
estimate the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance. We rely on three
measures of firm performance. The first measure is that of the stock return, which is
widely employed in the literature. The stock return indicates appreciation in the
stock price plus any dividends paid, divided by the original price, thus providing the
yield realized by shareholders. To check the robustness of our results, we test CEO
pay-performance sensitivity using another stock-based variable: market capitaliza-
tion. However, stock market-based variables are influenced by many factors beyond
managers’ control and for this reason, they may be a noisy measure of performance.
Moreover, because public utilities typically provide services of general interest and
may be asked to pursue general-purpose and consumer-welfare objectives, it would
be somewhat incomplete to rely exclusively on stock market-based measures.
Therefore, we also use an accounting-based measure of performance, return on
assets, or ROA (EBIT to total assets), which is a measure of profitability that scales
how efficiently a firm’s assets are employed (see also Hadlock et al. 2002).
To understand the differences in CEO incentives, we focus on differences across
industry segments and over time. We thus interact firm performance with a
dichotomous variable, REG, which indicates, in each year, whether a company is
subject to sectoral regulation. The dummy REG differs depending on whether a firm
is an electric or gas transmission or distribution operator and varies yearly, so it
allows us to capture changes in pay-performance when the status of the company
changes. The first, baseline model is a standard specification that adds CEO tenure,
firm size and country GDP. The i subscript indicates company observations, the
subscript t is reserved for index time, the subscript k refers to countries and the
subscript j refers to the industry (i.e., electricity and gas). For estimation, we rely on
the fixed-effect estimator, which allows us to capture all time-invariant character-
istics at the firm, industry and country levels.
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LogðCEOcompÞikjt ¼ aþ b1ðperformanceÞijkt þ b2ðperformanceÞijkt
 REGþ b3tenureijkt þ b4LogðTotal assetÞijkt þ b5GDPkt þ li þ ijkt
ð1Þ
The second specification adds a set of variables designed to describe the
environment in which the studied firms operate. First, as described in Sect. 3,
many energy firms are still partially owned by the state, which may affect both the
shareholders’ monitoring incentives and the managers’ behavior (Claessens et al.
2000; Faccio and Lang 2002). We therefore include a dichotomous variable
defining the firm as ‘‘state-controlled’’ if the state holds (either directly or
indirectly) up to 30 % of the ownership rights. Next, we account for potential
sources of influence on pay-for-performance sensitivity caused by industry and
country factors, such as the degree of market liberalization—which is expected to
introduce more competitive pressure—minority shareholder protection and stock
market development, which proxy for the degree of external discipline provided
by the financial market. The model is as follows:
LogðCEOcompÞijkt ¼ aþ b1ðperformanceÞijkt þ b2ðperformanceÞitjk  REG
þ b3tenureijkt þ b4LogðTotal assetÞijkt þ b5StateOwnershipijkt
þ b6OECD Index of liberalizationjkt þ b7Shareholder Protectionkt
þ b8MarketCap=GDPkt þ li þ ijkt
ð2Þ
5.2 Robustness analysis
To test the robustness of our results, we perform a sensitivity analysis to control for
sectorial specificities and the various degrees of internationalization of the
companies in our sample. In addition, because the recent corporate governance
literature (Kumar and Zattoni 2013) has focused on the potential influence of
national-level variables in understanding how corporate governance mechanisms
work, we also test whether the difference in pay-performance across regulatory
regimes survives when we introduce these variables in our regressions.
In more detail, to ensure that the empirical analysis (and the results) is not driven
by unspecified differences between the electric and gas utilities in the energy
industry, we first construct a dummy to identify electric companies and re-estimate
model (2) on this subsample.
Second, numerous firms in the dataset have operations in various countries
(inside and outside the EU). Because they tap the international capital market for
funds, multinational enterprises are likely subject to tighter corporate governance
discipline, which may reduce the differences between regulated and unregulated
firms. Moreover, multinational enterprises have complex internal organizations and
typically enjoy access to a larger, more sophisticated market for managers.
Additionally, in recent years some energy companies have merged to expand their
businesses abroad. This implies that a firm has merged or acquired another firm to
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become an international company. To allow for the potential effect of internation-
alization on the structure of CEO compensation and to control for merger and
acquisition operations, we collected information about each firm’s geographical
diversification and constructed a time-varying dummy variable that takes a value
equal to 1 when a firm has multinational operations.7 Because multinational status
does not vary over time in the sample period, we use the dummy to separate the
sample (similar to the above analysis of the electric firms) and re-estimate model (2)
for the two subsamples of multinational and ‘‘local’’ energy firms.
Finally, following Aslan and Kumar (2014), we consider that the national
governance system variables may affect the agency costs of dominant shareholders,
the efficiency of enforcement of contacts and the quality of information
disclosure—and thus, the propensity to adopt incentive compensation schemes.
Therefore, in our third model, we add the following country-specific variables:
Legal Origin, a dummy variable that is 1 if the country’s legal origin is common law
(La Porta et al. 1999); Anti Director measures the degree of minority shareholder
protection ranging from 0 to 7; Enforcement measures the efficiency of debt
Table 5 Model (2): controlling for Firm Ownership, Market Liberalization and Financial Institutions
Log (CEO compensation)
Stock Return Log (Market Cap) Log (ROA)
(1) (2) (3)
Performance 0.31** (2.14) 0.36** (2.61) 0.23*** (2.89)
Performance 9 REG -0.34** (-2.19) -0.29* (-1.97) -0.18* (-1.97)
CEO Tenure 0.06*** (3.24) 0.05*** (2.86) 0.04** (2.11)
Log (Total Asset) 0.13 (1.59) 0.20** (2.60) 0.29*** (3.39)
State Ownership -0.31* (-1.65) -0.31 (-1.64) -0.31 (-1.49)
OECD Index of Liberalization -0.12 (-1.40) -0.19*** (-3.45) -0.15* (-1.70)
Shareholder Protection -0.01 (-0.52) -0.02* (-1.65) -0.01 (-0.98)
Market Cap/GDP -0.0002 (-0.23) -0.0002 (-0.59) -0.0005 (-0.65)
R-squared 0.30 0.35 0.32
N. Obs 353 346 360
N. Firms 54 55 53
Panel regressions with firm-specific fixed effects Robust standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics
are reported in brackets
*, ** and *** denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 % respectively. Variables are adjusted by inflation. CEO
compensation, Stock Return, ROA, Market Capitalization, CEO Tenure and Log (Total Asset) are defined
as in Table 1. REG is a dummy equal to 1 when the firm is regulated. State Ownership is a dummy
variable that is 1 when the state has at least 30 % the control rights. OECD Index of Liberalization
indicates the degree of market competition: a high value of this index is associated with a low degree of
market competition and liberalization. Shareholder Protection measures shareholder and creditors’
protection, as well as the quality of the law enforcement: a high value is associated with a larger
protection of investors and control over CEO performance. Market Cap/GDP is the ratio between total
stock market capitalization and the Gross Domestic Product
7 We thank the anonymous referees for suggesting this further control.
Econ Polit Ind (2016) 43:127–155 143
123
contracts’ enforcement (Djankov et al. 2008); and Disclosure shows the stringency
of disclosure requirements (La Porta et al. 1999). Notably, however, because all of
these variables are time invariant and thus perfectly collinear to the fixed firm-
specific effect, for estimation, we rely on the generalized least squares random
effects model. The specification becomes:
LogðCEOcompÞijkt
¼ aþ b1ðperformanceÞijkt þ b2ðperformanceÞijkt  REG
þ b3tenureijkt þ b4LogðTotal assetÞijkt þ b5State Ownershipijkt
þ b6OECD Index of Liberalizationjkt þ b7Market Cap=GDPkt þ b8GDPkt
þ b9LegalOriginkt þ b10AntiDirectorkt þ b11Enforcementkt
þ b12Disclosurekt þ li þ ijkt
ð3Þ
6 Regulated versus deregulated energy firms: the empirical results
We start with the results of the baseline model (1) in Table 4 and then proceed with
the augmented models in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8.
Table 6 Model (2): CEO pay for performance sensitivity for electric companies (subsample)
Log (CEO compensation)
Stock Return Log (Market Cap) Log (ROA)
(1) (2) (3)
Performance 0.35** (2.30) 0.38*** (2.59) 0.23** (2.53)
Performance 9 REG -0.33** (-2.05) -0.26* (-1.64) -0.16* (-1.59)
CEO Tenure 0.06*** (2.75) 0.05** (2.42) 0.04** (1.78)
Log (Total Asset) 0.24** (2.41) 0.24*** (2.78) 0.35*** (3.96)
State Ownership 0.06 (1.62) 0.12*** (2.57) 0.10*** (2.69)
OECD Index of Liberalization -0.06 (-0.80) -0.10* (-1.81) -0.91 (-1.09)
Market Cap/GDP 0.00 (0.53) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.08)
R-squared 0.62 0.07 0.65
N. Obs 291 286 297
N. Firms 45 46 45
Panel regressions with firm-specific fixed effects Robust standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics
are reported in brackets
*, ** and *** denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 % respectively. Variables are adjusted by inflation. CEO
compensation, Stock Return, ROA, Market Capitalization, CEO Tenure and Log (Total Asset) are defined
as in Table 1. REG is a dummy equal to 1 when the firm is regulated. State Ownership is a dummy
variable that is 1 when the state has at least 30 % the control rights. OECD Index of Liberalization
indicates the degree of market competition: a high value of this index is associated with a low degree of
market competition and liberalization. Market Cap/GDP is the ratio between total stock market capi-
talization and the Gross Domestic Product
144 Econ Polit Ind (2016) 43:127–155
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We find that performance terms enter with a positive and significant coefficient in
all columns, whereas the interactions with the REG dummy are negatively signed
and significant (Table 4). Taken together, these results indicate that pay-perfor-
mance elasticity in regulated firms is lower than in the subsample of unregulated
companies, supporting our hypothesis that regulation constrains CEOs’ decisional
power to reduce the scope of incentive-compensation contracts. This limited
managerial discretion will therefore reduce the consequences of CEOs’ decisions,
discouraging the adoption of costly corporate governance mechanisms in these
segments in which competitive pressure is weaker and possibly allowing managers
to ‘‘enjoy the quiet life’’ (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003); this is also confirmed by
the significantly larger compensation received by regulated CEOs. Finally, this
result is also consistent with Joskow et al. (1996), who explain that the lower
sensitivity reflects the political constraints on CEO compensation imposed (whether
directly or indirectly) by the regulated environment. Because of a politically
motivated ‘‘moral suasion’’, CEO compensation in regulated companies would
voluntarily be less tied to firm profitability. If we look at control variables, we find
that CEO tenure and firm size enter with positive and significant coefficients, as
expected. It is only in Columns (1) and (2) that firm size is not statistically
significant. Overall, the evidence in Table 4 suggests a significant difference in the
pay-performance sensitivity of unregulated and regulated energy firms in the EU.
Our second model takes into account differences in firm ownership, market
liberalization, shareholder protection and stock market development. In state-
controlled firms, CEOs are expected to receive lower compensation to avoid
fomenting dissent among the public. Conversely, a higher level of financial
development and market liberalization may positively influence the propensity to
rely on incentive compensation. The regressions in Table 5 control for these factors
and the results show that the key findings hold: in transmission- and distribution-
regulated firms, CEO compensation is significantly less responsive to variations in
firm performance than in the unregulated generation segment. The OECD Index of
Liberalization is negative and statistically significant in most columns. The negative
sign suggests that in more liberalized markets, CEOs receive higher compensation.
The variable State Ownership is negative and statistically significant in Column (1),
indicating that CEO compensation is lower in state-controlled firms as predicted by
Joskow et al. (1993). Shareholder Protection has a negative coefficient (significant
in Column (2)), showing that CEO compensation is lower in countries where the law
provides stronger investor protection, a result that is in line with the predictions of
the law and finance literature. Finally, we report no significant evidence that the
development of the stock market affects the level of CEO compensation in the
energy sector.
Our sample of energy firms includes both electric and gas utilities, which might
differ to some extent in terms of managerial practices and monitoring techniques in
spite of the fact that they both operate in the energy market. Therefore, to control for
the fact that the above differences in pay-performance sensitivity between regulated
and unregulated firms are not driven by unspecified cross-sector differences, we test
the model for the subsample of electric companies (Table 6). Comfortingly, the
results both support and confirm the evidence of lower elasticity of pay to
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performance within regulated electric firms. The performance term is positive and
statistically significant in all of the columns, and the interactions with the REG
dummy remain negative and significant.8 CEO tenure and Log Total Assets remain
positive and statistically significant, confirming that within electric companies, CEO
compensation increases with the number of years served and as the company
becomes bigger. Interestingly, however, we find that state ownership enters with a
positive sign, suggesting that CEOs in state-controlled electric companies are paid
more.
As a further control, we also checked whether the presence of foreign operations
might affect the structure of CEO compensation. For each company, we constructed
a dummy variable, multinationality, to indicate when the firm has foreign operations
and we re-estimated the pay-performance regressions for the subsample ‘‘Multina-
tional companies’’ and ‘‘Local companies’’ (Table 7). The results show interesting
differences between the two groups of firms. First, we find that within the sub-
sample of multinational companies, there is no difference in pay-for-performance
sensitivity between regulated and unregulated firms. Moreover, whereas CEO
tenure confirms its positive influence and State Ownership confirms its negative
effect on CEO pay as in Table 5, we notice that firm size is insignificant in this
sample, probably because all multinational firms are similarly large. In contrast, we
report interesting differences within the sub-sample of local energy companies
because both firm size and State Ownership positively affects the level of CEO pay,
whereas the difference in the sensitivity of pay to performance for regulated and
deregulated firms returns is statistically significant. Finally, we notice the negative
coefficient on the market capitalization to GDP ratio, which suggests that, all else
being equal, CEO pay in energy firms is larger when financial markets are less
developed. Overall, these results confirm that energy managers ‘‘enjoy the quiet
life’’ (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003) in local, state-owned regulated firms, in
which both competitive pressure and the financial market’s discipline appear
weaker.
In Table 8, we estimate the augmented model (3), in which we include the
country-level time-invariant variables to control for differences in the national
governance systems. We thus include Common Law, Anti Director Index and
Enforcement Index to capture the differences in national institutions. We add the
variable Disclosure to control for the strength of disclosure requirements. The
results in Table 8 show that Common Law enters with a positive sign and is
statistically significant, which indicates that CEO compensation is higher in
common law countries, although the negative sign on the Anti Director index
indicates that, ceteris paribus, where the protection of minority shareholders is
stronger, CEO compensation is lower. Turning to the other variables, we find a
positive coefficient on the Enforcement Index, thus denoting countries in which the
law is more effectively enforced, whereas the negative sign on Disclosure suggests
that CEO compensation is lower in countries with stronger disclosure requirements.
8 We also estimated the same specification on the subsample of gas utilities, although this group of firms
is smaller than the subsample of electric firms. The results are qualitatively similar. We do not report
them for reasons of space, but they are available on request.
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Finally, we notice that the key result on the lower pay-performance sensitivity
within regulated energy firms survives when accounting for all of these country-
specific characteristics of the national governance system.
7 Conclusions
This paper studies the effects of incentive mechanisms provided by economic
regulation and corporate governance in European energy firms in the period
2000–2011. Our results show that managerial incentives differ across regulated and
unregulated firms. Specifically, we find that pay-for-performance sensitivity in
regulated transmission and distribution operators is lower than in unregulated
generation firms. This evidence is robust across different measures of firm
performance and suggests that incentive compensation interacts with economic
regulation.
This difference could be explained by the different intensity of market
competition. Managers in regulated firms (transmission service operators or
distribution service operators) perform in a less competitive environment, where
profitability targets are more or less set by regulators. For this reason, shareholders
may be reluctant to bear the agency costs that are associated with high monetary
incentives tied to firm performance. Alternatively, the regulatory environment might
impose political constraints on CEO compensation, as suggested by Joskow et al.
(1996). Indeed, in many regulated utilities, particularly those that are state-
controlled, directors are either politicians or appointed by politicians who are
subject to public pressure (Faccio 2006). Therefore, to avoid public concern about
excessive CEO compensation, CEO remuneration is expected to be lower and less
tied to firm profitability.
Controlling for all of these factors, our results survive. Our key findings do not
change if we control for different national corporate governance attributes (investor
protection, legal origin, disclosure requirement and enforcement of the contracts).
The difference in pay-for-performance sensitivity between regulated and
unregulated firms suggests that incentive compensation is a weaker incentive
mechanism in companies operating in regulated and less competitive markets.
Appendix 1
See Table 9.
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Table 9 Energy firms by country and regulatory status
Country Company name Deregulated Regulated
Austria Verbund X
Belgium Elia System Operator X
Finland Fortum X
France Areva X
Electricite´ de France X
EDF Energies Nouvelles X
Electricite´ de Strasburg X
Sechilienne-Sidec X
Theolia X
Veolia X
Gaz de France X
GDF Suez X
Germany E.On X
En.BW X
MVV Energie X
RWE X
Vattenfall X
Mainova X
Italy Edison X
A2A X
Hera X
Enel X
ENI X
Terna X
Acea X
Iride X
Acegas-Aps X
ACSM X
Ascopiave X
Enia X
Snam X
Norway Hafslund ASA X
Poland PGE Polska Group Energetyczna X
ENEA X
Portugal Energias de Portugal X
Spain Endesa X
Gas Natural X
Iberdola X
Red Electrica Corporacion X
Enagas X
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Appendix 2
See Table 10.
Table 9 continued
Country Company name Deregulated Regulated
Switzerland Societa` Elettrica Sopracenerina X
BKW FMV X
Romande Energie Holding X
Alpiq Holding X
Repower X
UK Viridian X
British Energy X
BG Group X X
Drax Group X X
Helius Energy X X
International X
Power X
Jersey Electricity X
Novera Energy X
Renewable Energy X
Generation Ltd X
Renewable Energy X
Holding X
SSE X
Centrica X
Igas Energy X
National Grid X
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